When Ignorance is Bliss by Grunwald, Peter D. & Halpern, Joseph Y.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
51
00
80
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 25
 O
ct 
20
05
When Ignorance is Bliss
Peter D. Gru¨nwald
CWI, P.O. Box 94079
1090 GB Amsterdam
pdg@cwi.nl
http://www.grunwald.nl
Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853
halpern@cs.cornell.edu
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/halpern
Abstract
It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more in-
formation is better, and that information should
never be ignored. Here we argue, using both
a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in
some situations you are better off ignoring infor-
mation if your uncertainty is represented by a set
of probability measures. These include situations
in which the information is relevant for the pre-
diction task at hand. In the non-Bayesian anal-
ysis, we show how ignoring information avoids
dilation, the phenomenon that additional pieces
of information sometimes lead to an increase in
uncertainty. In the Bayesian analysis, we show
that for small sample sizes and certain predic-
tion tasks, the Bayesian posterior based on a non-
informative prior yields worse predictions than
simply ignoring the given information.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is
better, and that information should never be ignored. In-
deed, this has been formalized in a number of ways in
a Bayesian framework, where uncertainty is represented
by a probability measure [Good 1967; Raiffa and Shlaifer
1961]. In this paper, we argue that occasionally you are
better off ignoring information if your uncertainty is repre-
sented by a set of probability measures. Related observa-
tions have been made by Seidenfeld [2004]; we compare
our work to his in Section 5.
For definiteness, we focus on a relatively simple setting.
Let X be a random variable taking values in some set X ,
and let Y be a random variable taking values in some set
Y . The goal of an agent is to choose an action whose utility
depends only on the value of Y , after having observed the
value of X . We further assume that, before making the
observation, the agent has a prior PrY on the value of Y . If
the agent actually had a prior on the joint distribution of X
and Y , then the obvious thing to do would be to condition
on the observation, to get the best estimate of the value
of Y . But we are interested in situations where the agent
does not have a single prior on the joint distributions, but a
family of priors P . As the following example shows, this
is a situation that arises often.
Example 1.1: Consider a doctor who is trying to decide if
a patient has a flu or tuberculosis. The doctor then learns
the patient’s address. The doctor knows that the patient’s
address may be correlated with disease (tuberculosis may
be more prevalent in some parts of the city than others),
but does not know the correlation (if any) at all. In this
case, the random variable Y is the disease that the patient
has, Y = {flu, tuberculosis}, and X is the neighborhood in
which the agent lives. The doctor is trying to choose a treat-
ment. The effect of the treatment depends only on the value
of Y . Under these circumstances, many doctors would sim-
ply not take the patient’s address into account, thereby ig-
noring relevant information. In this paper we show that this
commonly-adopted strategy is often quite sensible.
There is a relatively obvious sense in which ignoring infor-
mation is the right thing to do. Let P be the set of all joint
distributions onX×Y whose marginal on Y is PrY . P rep-
resents the set of distributions compatible with the agent’s
knowledge. Roughly speaking, if a∗ is the best action given
just the prior PrY , then then a∗ gives the same payoff for
all joint distribution Pr ∈ P (since they all have marginal
PrY ) We can show that every other action a′ will do worse
than a∗ against some joint distribution Pr ∈ P . Therefore,
ignoring the information leads one to adopt the minimax
optimal decision. This idea is formalized as Proposition 2.1
in Section 2, where we also show that ignoring information
compares very favorably to the “obvious” way of updating
the set of measures P . Proposition 2.1 makes three impor-
tant assumptions:
1. There is no (second-order) distribution on the set of
probabilities P .
2. P contains all probability distributions on X × Y
whose marginal is PrY .
3. The “goodness” of an action a is measured by some
loss or utility that—although it may be unknown to the
agent at the time of updating—is fixed. In particular,
it does not depend on the observed value of X .
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the effect of
dropping these assumptions. In Section 3, we consider
what happens if we assume some probability distribution
on the set P of probabilities. The obvious question is
which one to use. We have to distinguish between purely
subjective Bayesian approaches and so-called “noninfor-
mative”, “pragmatic”, or “objective” Bayesian approaches
[Bernardo and Smith 1994], which are based on adopt-
ing so-called “non-informative priors”. We show that for
a large class of such priors, including the uniform dis-
tribution and Jeffreys’ prior, using the Bayesian posterior
may lead to worse decisions than using the prior PrY ; that
is, we may be better off ignoring information rather than
conditioning on a noninformative prior; see Examples 3.1
and 3.2. In these examples, the posterior is based on a
relatively small sample. Of course, as the sample grows
larger, then using any reasonable prior will result in a pos-
terior that converges to the true distribution. This fol-
lows directly from standard Bayesian consistency theorems
[Ghosal 1998].
In Section 4 we investigate the effect of dropping the sec-
ond and third assumptions. We show that once there is par-
tial information about the relationship between X and Y
(so that P is a strict subset of the set of all probability dis-
tributions on X ×Y whose marginal is PrY ), then the right
thing to do becomes sensitive to the kind of “bookie” or
“adversary” that the agent can be viewed as playing against
(cf. [Halpern and Tuttle 1993]). We consider some related
work, particularly that of Seidenfeld [2004], in Section 5.
Our focus in this paper is on optimality in the minimax
sense. It is not clear that this is the most appropriate notion
of optimality. Indeed, Seidenfeld explicitly argues that it
is not, and the analysis in Section 4 suggests that there are
situations when ignoring information is a reasonable thing
to do, even though this is not the minimax approach. We
discuss alternative notions on optimality in Section 5. We
conclude with further discussion in Section 6.
2 WHEN IGNORING HELPS: A
NON-BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
In this section, we formalize our problem in a non-Bayesian
setting. We then show that, in this setting, under some prag-
matic assumptions, ignoring information is a sensible strat-
egy. We also show that ignoring information compares fa-
vorably to the standard approach of working with sets of
measures on X × Y .
As we said, we are interested in an agent who must choose
some action from a set A, where the loss of the action de-
pends only on the value of a random variable Y , which
takes values in Y . We assume that with each action a ∈ A
and value y ∈ Y is associated some loss to the agent.
(The losses can be negative, which amounts to a gain.) Let
L : Y × A → IR ∪ {∞} be the loss function.1 For ease of
exposition, we assume in this paper that A is finite.
For every action a ∈ A, let La be the random variable on Y
such thatLa(y) = L(y, a). SinceA is assumed to be finite,
for every distribution PrY on Y , there is a (not necessarily
unique) action a∗ ∈ A that achieves minimum expected
loss, that is,
inf
a∈A
(EPrY [La]) = EPrY [La∗ ] (1)
If all the agent knows is PrY , then it seems reasonable for
the agent to choose an action a∗ that minimizes expected
loss. We call such an action a∗ an optimal action for PrY .
Suppose that the agent observes the value of a variable X
that takes on values in X . Further assume that, although
the agent knows the marginal distribution PrY of Y , she
does not know how Y depends on X . That is, the agent’s
uncertainty is characterized by the set P consisting of all
distributions on X × Y with marginal distribution PrY on
Y . The agent now must choose a decision rule that deter-
mines what she does as a function of her observations. We
allow decision rules to be randomized. Thus, if ∆(A) con-
sists of all probability distributions on A, a decision rule is
a function δ : X → ∆(A) that chooses a distribution over
actions based on her observations. Let D(X ,A) be the set
of all such decision rules. A special case is a determinis-
tic decision rule, that assigns probability 1 to a particular
action. If δ is deterministic, we sometimes abuse notation
and write δ(x) for the action that is assigned probability
1 by the distribution δ(x). Given a decision rule δ and a
loss function L, let Lδ be the random variable on X × Y
such that Lδ(x, y) =
∑
a∈A δ(x)(a)L(y, a). Here δ(x)(a)
stands for the probability of performing action a according
to the distribution δ(x) over actions that is adopted when x
is observed. Note that in the special case that δ is a deter-
ministic decision rule, then Lδ(x, y) = L(y, δ(x)). More-
over, if δa is the (deterministic) decision rule that always
chooses a, then Lδa(x, y) = La(y).
The following result, whose proof we leave to the full pa-
per, shows that the decision rule δ∗ that always chooses an
optimal action a∗ for PrY , independent of the observation,
is optimal in a minimax sense. Note that the worst-case ex-
pected loss of decision-rule δ is supPr∈P EPr[Lδ]. Thus,
the best worst-case loss (i.e., the minimax loss) over all de-
cision rules is infδ∈D(X ,A) supPr∈P EPr[Lδ].
1We could equally well use utilities, which can be viewed as
a positive measure of gain. Losses seem to be somewhat more
standard in this literature.
Proposition 2.1: Suppose that PrY is an arbitrary distri-
bution on Y , L is an arbitrary loss function, P consists of
all distributions on X × Y with marginal PrY , and a∗ is
an optimal action for PrY (with respect to the loss function
L). Then EPrY [La∗ ] = infδ∈D(X ,A) supPr∈P EPr[Lδ].
A standard decision rule when uncertainty is represented
by a set P of probability measures is the Maxmin Expected
Utility Rule [Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989]; compute the
expected utility (or expected loss) of an action with re-
spect to each of the probability measures in P , and then
choose the action whose worst-case expected utility is best
(or worst-case expected loss is least). Proposition 2.1 says
that if P consists of all probability measures with marginal
PrY and the loss depends only on the value of Y , then the
action with the least worst-case loss is an optimal action
with respect to PrY .
Example 2.2: Consider perhaps the simplest case, where
X = Y = {0, 1}. Suppose that our agent knows that
EPrY [Y ] = PrY (Y = 1) = p for some fixed p. As before,
let P be the set of distributions on X × Y with marginal
PrY . Suppose further that the only actions are 0 and 1 (in-
tuitively, these actions amount to predicting the value of
Y ), and that the loss function is 0 if the right value is pre-
dicted and 1 otherwise; that is, L(i, j) = |i − j|. This is
the so-called 0/1 or classification loss. It is easy to see that
E[L0] = p and E[L1] = 1 − p, so the optimal act is to
choose 0 if p < .5 and 1 if p > .5 (both acts have loss 1/2
if p = .5). The loss of the optimal act is min(p, 1− p).
Perhaps the more standard approach for dealing with un-
certainty in this case is to work with the whole set of dis-
tributions. Assume that 0 < Pr(Y = 1) = p < 1. Let
Pi = {Pr(· | X = i) : Pr ∈ P}, i = 0, 1. Then for all
q ∈ [0, 1], both P0 and P1 contain a distribution Prq such
that Prq(Y = 1) = q. In other words, P0 = P1 = ∆(Y),
the set of all distributions on Y . Observing X = x causes
all information about Y to be lost. Remarkably, this holds
no matter what value of X is observed.
Thus, even though the agent knew that Pr(Y = 1) = p
before observing X , after observing X , the agent has no
idea of the probability that Y = 1. This is a special case
of a phenomenon that has been called dilation in the statis-
tical and imprecise probability literature [Augustin 2003;
Cozman and Walley 2001; Herron, Seidenfeld, and Wasser-
man 1997; Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993]: it is possi-
ble that lower probabilities strictly decrease and that upper
probabilities strictly increase, no matter what value of x is
observed. Dilation has severe consequences for decision-
making. The minimax-optimal decision rule δ∗ with re-
spect to PY is to randomize, choosing both 0 and 1 with
probability 1/2. Note that, no matter what Pr ∈ P actually
obtains,
EPr[La∗ ] = min{p, 1− p} ; EPr[Lδ∗ ] = 1/2.
Thus, if p is close to 0 or 1, ignoring information does much
better than making use of it.
This can be viewed as an example of what decision theo-
rists have called time inconsistency. Suppose, for definite-
ness, that p = 1/3. Then, a priori, the optimal strategy is
to decide 0 no matter what. On the other hand, if either
X = 0 or X = 1 is observed, then the optimal action is
to randomize. When uncertainty is described with a single
probability distribution (and updating is done by condition-
ing), then time inconsistency cannot occur.2
3 WHEN IGNORING HELPS: A
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
Suppose that, instead of having just a set P of probability
measures, the agent has a probability measure on P . But
then which probability measure should she take? Broadly
speaking, there are two possibilities here. We can con-
sider either purely subjective Bayesian agents or pragmatic
Bayesian agents. A purely subjective Bayesian agent will
come up with some (arbitrary) prior that expresses her sub-
jective beliefs about the situation. It then makes sense to as-
sess the consequences of ignoring information in terms of
expected loss, where the expectation is taken with respect
to the agent’s subjective prior. Good’s total evidence the-
orem, a classical result of Bayesian decision theory [Good
1967; Raiffa and Shlaifer 1961], states that, when taking
the expectation with respect to the agent’s prior, the opti-
mal decision should always be based on conditioning on
all the available information—information should never be
ignored.
In contrast, we consider an agent who adopts Bayesian up-
dating for pragmatic reasons (i.e., because it usually works
well) rather than for fundamental reasons. In this case, be-
cause computation time is limited and/or prior knowledge
is hard to obtain or formulate, the prior adopted is typically
easily computable and “noninformative”, such as a prior
that is uniform in some natural parameterization of P . We
suspect that many statisticians are pragmatic Bayesians in
this sense. (Indeed, most “Bayesian” UAI and statistics pa-
pers adopt pragmatic priors that cannot seriously be viewed
as fully subjective.) When analyzing such a pragmatic ap-
proach, it no longer makes that much sense to compare
ignoring information to Bayesian updating on new infor-
mation by looking at the expected loss with respect to the
adopted prior. The reason is that the prior can no longer
be expected to correctly reflect the agent’s degrees of be-
lief. It seems more meaningful to pick a single probability
measure Pr and to analyze the behavior of the Bayesian un-
der the assumption that Pr is the “true” state of nature. By
varying Pr over the set P , we can get a sense of the behav-
2It has been claimed that this time consistency also depends
on the agent having perfect recall; see [Halpern 1997; Piccione
and Rubinstein 1997] for some discussion of this issue.
ior of Bayesian updating in all possible situations. This is
the type of analysis that we adopt in this section; it is quite
standard in the statistical literature on consistency of Bayes
methods [Blackwell and Dubins 1962; Ghosal 1998].
We focus on a large class of priors on P that includes most
standard recommendations for noninformative priors. Es-
sentially, we show that for any prior in the class, when the
sample size is small, ignoring information is better than us-
ing the Bayesian posterior. That is, if a pragmatic agent
has the choice between (a) first adopting a pragmatic prior,
perhaps not correctly reflecting her own beliefs, and then
reasoning like a Bayesian, or, (b) simply ignoring the avail-
able information, then, when the sample size is small, she
might prefer option (b). On the other hand, as more infor-
mation becomes available, the Bayesian posterior behaves
almost as well as ignoring the information in the worst case,
and substantially better than ignoring in most other cases.
(Of course, part of the issue here is what counts as “bet-
ter” when uncertainty is represented by a set of probability
measures. For the time being, we say that “A is better than
B” if A achieves better minimax behavior than B. We return
to this issue at the end of this section.)
Example 3.1: As in Example 2.2, let X = Y = {0, 1}. For
definiteness, suppose that the known prior PrY is such that
PrY (Y = 1) = p. Throughout this section we assume that
0 < p < 1. A probability measure on X ×Y is completely
determined by Pr(X = 1 | Y = 1) and Pr(X = 1 | Y =
0). Moreover, for every choice (α, β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] for
these two conditional probabilities, there is a probability
Prα,β ∈ P ; in fact
Prα,β(X = 1, Y = 1) = pα;
Prα,β(X = 1, Y = 0) = (1− p)β;
Prα,β(X = 0, Y = 1) = p(1− α);
Prα,β(X = 0, Y = 0) = (1− p)(1 − β).
Notice that Prα,β(X = 1) = pα + (1 − p)β. Given this,
one obvious way to put a uniform prior on P is just to take
a uniform prior on the square [0, 1]2; we adopt this prior
for the time being and consider other notions of “uniform”
further below.
To calculate the Bayesian predictions of Y given X ,
we must first determine the Bayesian “marginal” prob-
ability measure Pr, where Pr(X = i, Y = j) =∫ 1
α=0
∫ 1
β=0
Prα,β(X = i, Y = j)dαdβ (“marginal” be-
cause we are marginalizing out the parameters α and β),
and then use Pr to calculate the expected loss of predict-
ing Y = 1. That is, we calculate the so-called “predictive
distribution” Pr(Y = · | X = ·). We can calculate this
directly without performing any integration as follows. By
symmetry, we must have Pr(Y = 1 | X = 1) = Pr(Y =
1 | X = 0). Now if γ = Pr(X = 1), then it must be the
case that γPr(Y = 1 | X = 1) + (1− γ)Pr(Y = 1 | X =
0) = p; this implies that Pr(Y = 1 | X = 1) = p. Thus,
when calculating the predictive distribution of Y after ob-
serving X , the Bayesian will always ignore the value of X
and predict with his marginal distribution PrY .
Thus, before observing data, the Bayesian ignores the value
of X , and thus makes minimax-optimal decisions. Poten-
tially suboptimal behavior of the Bayesian can occur only
after the Bayesian has observed some data. To analyze this
case, we need to assume that we have a sequence of n ob-
servations (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn) and are trying to predict
the value of Yn+1, given the value of Xn+1. The distribu-
tion Prα,β on X × Y is extended to a distribution Prnα,β
on (X × Y)n by assuming that the observations are inde-
pendent. Of course, the hope is that the observations will
help us learn about α and β, allowing us to make better de-
cisions on Y . To take the simplest case, suppose that we
have observed that (X1, Y1) = (1, 1), and X2 = 1, and
want to calculate the value of Y2. Note that
Pr
2
(Y2 = 1 | X2 = 1, (X1, Y1) = (1, 1))
= Pr
2
((X2,Y2)=(1,1),(X1,Y1)=(1,1))∑
y∈{0,1}Pr
2
((X2,Y2)=(1,y),(X1,Y1)=(1,1))
=
∫ 1
α=0
∫ 1
β=0
(pα)2dαdβ
∫
1
α=0
∫
1
β=0
(pα)2dαdβ+
∫
1
α=0
∫
1
β=0
(pα)(1−p)βdαdβ
=
1
3 p
1
3p+(1−p)
1
4
= 4p
p+3 .
Since we must have Pr2(Y2 = 1 | (X1, Y1) = (1, 1)) =
p, it follows using the same symmetry argument as above
that if (X1, Y1) = (1, 1), then, no matter what value of
X2 is observed, the value of X2 is not ignored. Similar
calculations show that, if (X1, Y1) = (i, j) for all i, j ∈
{0, 1}, then, no matter what value of X2 is observed, the
value of X2 is not ignored.
In Example 3.1 we claimed that the Bayesian should pre-
dict by the predictive distribution Pr2(Y = 1 | X = 1) as
defined in the example. While this is the standard Bayesian
approach, one may also directly consider the “expected”
conditional probability
∫ 1
α=0
∫ 1
β=0
Pr2α,β(Y = 1 | X = 1).
These two approaches give different answers, since expec-
tation does not commute with division. To see why we
prefer the standard approach, note that, because of inde-
pendence, Pr2α,β(Y2 = i | X2 = j, (X1, Y1) = (i′, j′)) =
Prα,β((X1, Y1) = (i
′, j′)) Prα,β(Y2 = i | X2 = j);
similarly with repeated observations. That is, with the al-
ternative approach, there would be no learning from data.
Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we use the predictive-
distribution approach, with no further comment.
Example 3.2: Now consider the more general situation
where X = {1, . . . ,M} for arbitrary M , and Y = {0, 1}
as before. We consider a straightforward extension of the
previous set of distributions: let ~α = (α1, . . . , αM ) be an
element of the M -dimensional unit simplex; ~β is defined
similarly. Fix p ∈ [0, 1], and define
Pr
~α,~β
(Y = 1) = p; Pr
~α,~β
(X = j | Y = 1) = αj ;
Pr
~α,~β
(X = j | Y = 0) = βj .
Note that
Pr
~α,~β
(X = j, Y = 1) = αjp
and
Pr
~α,~β
(X = j, Y = 0) = βj(1− p).
Let D be a random variable used to denote the outcome of
then n observations (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn). Given a se-
quence (~x, ~y) = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) of observations,
let n(~x,~y)k denote the number of observations in the se-
quence with Yi = k, for k ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, n(~x,~y)(j,k) de-
notes the number of observations (Xi, Yi) in the sequence
with (Xi = j, Yi = k). Then
Prn
~α,~β
(D = (~x, ~y))
= pn
(~x,~y)
1 (1− p)n
(~x,~y)
0
∏M
j=1 α
n
(~x,~y)
(j,1)
j
∏M
j=1 β
n
(~x,~y)
(j,0)
j .
We next put a prior on P = {Pr
~α,~β
: α, β ∈ [0, 1]} We
restrict attention to priors that can be written as a prod-
uct of Dirichlet distributions [Bernardo and Smith 1994].
A Dirichlet distribution on the M -dimensional unit sim-
plex ∆M (which we can identify with the set of proba-
bility distributions on {1, . . . ,M}) is parameterized by an
M -dimensional vector ~a. For ~a = (a1, . . . , aM ), the ~a-
Dirichlet distribution has density p~a that satisfies, for all
~α ∈ ∆M ,
p~a(~α) =
1
Z(~a)
αa1−11 · . . . · α
aM−1
M ,
where Z(~a) =
∫
~α∈∆M
αa1−11 · . . . · α
aM−1
M d~α is a normal-
izing factor. Note that the uniform prior is the ~a-Dirichlet
prior where a1 = a2 = . . . = aM = 1. As we shall see,
many other priors of interest are special cases of Dirichlet
priors.
We consider only priors w on P that satisfy w(~α, ~β) =
w~a(~α)w~b(
~β) for all ~α, ~β ∈ ∆M , where w~a and w~b are of
the Dirichlet form. Then
Pr
n
(D = (~x, ~y))
=
∫
~α∈∆M
∫
~β∈∆M
Prn
~α,~β
(D = (~x, ~y))w~a(~α)w~b(
~β)d~αd~β.
(2)
Now suppose that a Bayesian has observed an initial sam-
ple D of size n andXn+1, and must predict Yn+1. Suppose
Xn+1 = k. Then the Bayesian’s predictive distribution be-
comes Pr
n+1
(Yn+1 = · | Xn+1, D) or, more explicitly,
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1 = j | Xn+1 = k,D = (~x, ~y))
= Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k,Yn+1=j)
Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k)
.
It will be convenient to represent this distribution by the
odds ratio
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=1|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=0|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
= Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k,Yn+1=1)
Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k,Yn+1=0)
.
(3)
Both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand
side of (3) are of the form (2), so this expression is a ratio
of Dirichlet integrals. These can be calculated explicitly
[Bernardo and Smith 1994], giving
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=1|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=0|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
= Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k,Yn+1=1)
Pr
n+1
(D=(~x,~y),Xn+1=k,Yn+1=0)
= p1−p ·
n
(~x,~y)
(k,1)
+ak
n
(~x,~y)
(k,0)
+bk
·
n
(~x,~y)
0 +
∑
M
k=1
bk
n
(~x,~y)
1 +
∑
M
k=1
ak
.
(4)
With the uniform prior, (4) simplifies to
p
1− p
·
n
(~x,~y)
(k,1) + 1
n
(~x,~y)
(k,0) + 1
·
n
(~x,~y)
0 +M
n
(~x,~y)
1 +M
. (5)
(4) and (5) show that the odds-ratio behaves like p/(1− p)
(which would be the odds-ratio obtained by ignoring the
values of X) times some “correction factor”. Ideally this
correction factor would be close to 1 for small samples and
then smoothly change “in the right direction”, so that the
Bayesian’s predictions are never much worse than the min-
imax predictions and, as more data comes in, get monoton-
ically better and better. We now consider two examples to
show the extent to which this happens.
First, take M = 2, and let Pr be such that Pr(Y = 1) = p,
Pr(X = 1|Y = 1) = 1, and Pr(X = 0|Y = 0) = 1.
Then, for k = 1, (4) becomes
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=1|Xn+1=1,D=(~x,~y))
Pr
n+1
(Yn+1=0|Xn+1=1,D=(~x,~y))
= p1−p ·
n
(~x,~y)
1 +1
1 ·
n
(~x,~y)
0 +2
n
(~x,~y)
1 +2
.
For all but the smallest n, with high Pr-probability,
n
(~x,~y)
1 ≈ pn. Thus, the odds ratio tends to infinity, as ex-
pected.
In the previous example, X and Y were completely corre-
lated. Suppose that they are independent. That is, suppose
again that M = 2, but that Pr is such that Pr(Y = 1 | X =
k) = p, for k = 0, 1. For simplicity, we further suppose
that p = 1/2 and that Pr(X = 0) = Pr(X = 1) = 1/2;
the same argument applies with little change if we drop
these assumptions.
Given α > 1, consider a loss function Lα with asymmetric
misclassification costs, given by Lα(0, 0) = Lα(1, 1) = 0;
Lα(1, 0) = 1; Lα(0, 1) = α. Clearly, EPrY [L0] = 0.5 and
EPrY [L1] = 0.5α. Thus, the optimal action with respect
to the prior PrY is to predict 0, and the minimax-optimal
action is to always predict 0. Moreover, the expected loss
of predicting 1 is .5(α− 1).
Now consider the predictions of a Bayesian who uses the
uniform prior. The Bayesian will predict 1 iff
E
Pr(Yn+1|Xn+1,D)
[L1]
E
Pr(Yn+1|Xn+1,D)
[L0]
= αPr(Yn+1=0|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
Pr(Yn+1=1|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
< 1.
From the odds-ratio (5) we see that this holds iff
α < Pr(Yn+1=1|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
Pr(Yn+1=0|Xn+1=k,D=(~x,~y))
=
n
(~x,~y)
(k,1)
+1
n
(~x,~y)
(k,0)
+1
·
n
(~x,~y)
0 +2
n
(~x,~y)
1 +2
.
(6)
If β is the probability (with respect to Prn) of (6), then
the difference between the Bayesian’s expected loss and the
expected loss of someone who ignores the information is
β(α− 1)/2. Clearly, β depends on α and n. Moreover, for
any fixed α > 1, limn→∞ β → 0. This, of course, just says
that eventually the Bayesian will learn correctly. However,
for relatively small n, it is not hard to construct situations
where β(α− 1)/2 can be nontrivial. For example, if n = 4
and α = 1.4, then β ∼ .35. (We computed this by a brute
force calculation, by considering all the values n(~x,~y)(k,j) that
cause (6) to be true, and computing their probability.) Thus,
the Bayesian’s expected loss is about 14% worse than that
of an agent who ignores the information.
Although in this example there is no dependence between
X and Y in the actual distribution, by continuity, the same
result holds if there is some dependence.
This conclusion assumed that a Bayesian chose a partic-
ular noninformative prior, but it does not depend strongly
on this choice. As is well known, there is no unique way
of defining a “uniform prior” on a set of distributions P ,
since what is “uniform” depends on the chosen parame-
terization. For this reason, people have developed other
types of noninformative priors. One of the most well-
known of these is the so-called Jeffreys’ prior [Jeffreys
1946; Bernardo and Smith 1994], specifically designed as
a prior expressing “ignorance”. This prior is invariant un-
der continuous 1-to-1 reparameterizations ofP . It turns out
that Jeffreys’ prior on the set P is also of the Dirichlet form
(with a1 = . . . = an = b1 = . . . = bn = 1/2) so that it
satisfies (4) (see, for example, [Kontkanen, Myllyma¨ki, Si-
lander, Tirri, and Gru¨nwald 2000]). Other pragmatic priors
that are often used in practice are the so-called equivalent
sample size (ESS) priors [Kontkanen, Myllyma¨ki, Silan-
der, Tirri, and Gru¨nwald 2000]. For the case of our P ,
these also take the Dirichlet form. Thus, the analysis of
Example 3.2 does not substantially change if we use the
Jeffreys’ prior or an ESS prior. It remains the case that, for
certain sample sizes, ignoring information is preferable to
using the Bayesian posterior.
Example 3.2 shows that with noninformative priors, for
small sample sizes, ignoring the information may be bet-
ter than Bayesian updating. Essentially, the reason for this
is that all standard noninformative priors assign probability
zero to the set of distributions P ′ ⊆ P according to which
X and Y are independent. But the measures in P ′ are ex-
actly the ones that lead to minimax-optimal decisions. Of
course, there is no reason that a Bayesian must use a non-
informative prior. In some settings it may be preferable to
adopt a “hierarchical pragmatic prior” that puts a uniform
probability on both P −P ′ and P ′, and assigns probability
0.5 to each of P − cP ′ and P ′. Such a prior makes it eas-
ier for a Bayesian to learn that X and Y are independent.
(A closely related prior has been used by Barron, Rissanen,
and Yu [1998], in the context of universal coding, with a
logarithmic loss function.) With such a prior, a Bayesian
would do better in this example.
The notion of optimality that we have used up to now is
minimax loss optimality. Prediction i is better than pre-
diction j if the worst-case loss when predicting i (taken
over all possible priors in P) is better than the worst-case
loss when predicting j. But there are certainly other quite
reasonable criteria that could be used when comparing pre-
dictions. In particular, we could consider minimax regret.
That is, we could consider the prediction that minimizes
the worst-case difference between the best prediction for
each Pr ∈ P and the actual prediction. In the second half
of Example 3.2, we calculated that if the true probability
Pr is such that Pr(X = 0) = Pr(X = 1) = 1/2 and
Pr makes X and Y independent, then the difference be-
tween the loss incurred by an agent that ignores the prior
and a Bayesian is roughly .07. We do not know if there
are probabilities Pr′ for which the Bayesian agent does
much worse than an agent who ignores the prior with re-
spect to Pr′. On the other hand, if X and Y are completely
correlated, that is, if the true probability Pr is such that
Pr(Y = 1 | X = 1) = Pr(Y = 0 | X = 0) = 1, then
if n = 4 and α = 1.4, the Bayesian will predict correctly,
while half the time the agent that ignores information will
not. Then the difference between the loss incurred by the
Bayesian agent and the agent that ignores the information
is 0.5. Thus, in the sense of expected regret, the Bayesian
approach is bound to be at least as good as ignoring the in-
formation in this example. We are currently investigating
whether this is true more generally.
4 PARTIAL IGNORANCE AND
DIFFERENT TYPES OF BOOKIES
In Sections 2 and 3, we showed that ignoring information
is sensible as long as (1) the set P contains all distribu-
tions on X × Y with the given marginal PrY , and (2) the
loss function L is fixed; in particular, it does not depend on
the realized value of X . In this section, we consider what
happens when we drop these assumptions.
The assumption that P contains all distributions on X ×Y
with the given marginal PrY amounts to the assumption
that all the agent knows is PrY . If an agent has more infor-
mation about the probability distribution on X × Y , then
ignoring information is in general not a reasonable thing
to do. To take a simple example, suppose that the set P
contains only one distribution P ◦. Then clearly the mini-
max optimal strategy is to use the decision rule based on
the conditional distribution P ◦(Y | X), which means that
all available information is taken into account. Using P ◦Y
is clearly not the right thing to do.
On the other hand, if P is neither a singleton nor the set
of all distributions with the given marginal PrY , then ig-
noring may or may not be minimax optimal, depending on
the details of P . Even in some cases where ignoring is not
minimax optimal, it may still be a reasonable update rule to
use, because, no matter what P is, ignoring X is a reliable
update rule [Gru¨nwald 2000]. This means the following:
Suppose that the loss function L is known to the agent. Let
a∗ be the optimal action resulting from ignoring informa-
tion about X , that is, adopting the marginal PrY as the
distribution of Y , independently of what X was observed.
Then it must be the case that
EPrY [La∗ ] = E
(X,Y )
Pr [La∗(X,Y )], (7)
meaning that the loss the agent expects to have using his
adopted action a∗ is guaranteed to be identical to the true
expected loss of the agent’s action a∗. Thus, the quality of
the agent’s predictions is exactly as good as the agent thinks
they are, and the agent cannot be overly optimistic about
his own performance. Data will behave as if the agent’s
adopted distribution PrY is correct, even though it is not.
This desirable property of reliability is lost when the loss
function can depend on the observation X . To understand
the impact of this possibility, consider again the situation
of Example 2.2, except now assume that the loss function
can depend on the observation.
Example 4.1: As in Example 2.2, assume that X = Y =
{0, 1}, that the agent knows that EPrY [Y ] = PrY (Y =
1) = p for some fixed p, and letP be the set of distributions
on X ×Y with marginal PrY . Now the loss function takes
three arguments, whereL(i, j, k) is the loss if i is predicted,
the true value of Y is j, and X = k is observed. Suppose
that L(i, j, k) = (k + 1)|i − j|. That is, if the observation
is 0, then, as before, the loss is just the difference between
the predicted value and actual value; on the other hand, if
the observation is 1, then the loss is twice the difference.
Note that, with this loss function, it technically no longer
makes sense to talk about ignoring the information, since
we cannot even talk about the optimal rule with respect to
PrY . However, as we shall see, the optimal action is still to
predict the most likely value according to PrY .
A priori, there are four possible deterministic decision
rules, which have the form “Predict i if 0 is observed
and j if 1 is observed”, which we abbreviate as δij , for
i, j ∈ {0, 1}. It is easy to check that
EPr[Lδ00 ] = Pr(1, 0) + 2Pr(1, 1) = PrY (1) + Pr(1, 1)
EPr[Lδ01 ] = Pr(1, 0) + 2Pr(0, 1)
EPr[Lδ10 ] = Pr(0, 0) + 2Pr(1, 1)
EPr[Lδ11 ] = Pr(0, 0) + 2Pr(0, 1) = PrY (0) + Pr(0, 1).
It is not hard to show that randomization does not help in
this case, and the minimax optimal decision rule is to pre-
dict 0 if PrY (1) = p < 1/2 and 1 if p > 1/2 (with any
way of randomizing leading to the same loss if p = 1/2).
Thus, the minimax-optimal decision rule still chooses the
most likely prediction according to PrY , independent of
the observation.
On the other hand, if either 0 or 1 is observed, the same
arguments as before show that the minimax-optimal action
with respect to the conditional probability is to randomize,
predicting both 0 and 1 with probability 1/2. So again, we
have time inconsistency in the sense discussed in Section 2,
and ignoring the information is the right thing to do.
But now consider what happens when the loss function is
L′(i, j, k) = (|k − j|+ 1)|i − j|. Thus, if the actual value
and the observation are the same, then the loss function is
the difference between the actual value and the prediction;
however, if the actual value and the observation are differ-
ent, then the loss is twice the difference. Again we have the
same four decision rules as above, but now we have
EPr[L
′
δ00
] = 2Pr(1, 0) + Pr(1, 1) = PrY (1) + Pr(1, 0)
EPr[L
′
δ01
] = 2Pr(1, 0) + 2Pr(0, 1)
EPr[Lδ10 ] = Pr(0, 0) + Pr(1, 1)
EPr[Lδ11 ] = Pr(0, 0) + 2Pr(0, 1) = PrY (0) + Pr(0, 1).
Now the minimax-optimal rule is to predict 0 if PrY (1) ≤
1/3, to predict 1 if PrY (1) ≥ 2/3, and to use the ran-
domized decision rule 13δ01 +
2
3δ10 (which has expected
loss 2/3) if 1/3 ≤ PrY (1) ≤ 2/3). (In the case that
PrY (1) = 1/3 or PrY (1) = 2/3, then the two recom-
mended rules have the same payoff.)
On the other hand, if i is observed (i ∈ {0, 1}), then the
minimax optimal action is to predict i with probability 1/3
and 1− i with probability 2/3. That is, the optimal strategy
corresponds to the decision rule 13δ01 +
2
3δ10. Thus, in this
case, there is no time inconsistency if 1/3 ≤ PrY (1) ≤
2/3.
5 RELATED WORK
In this section we compare our work to recent and closely
related work by Seidenfeld [2004] and Augustin [2003], as
well as to various results indicating that information should
never be ignored.
Augustin’s and Seidenfeld’s work Seidenfeld [2004]
provides an analysis of minimax decision rules which is
closely related to ours, but with markedly different conclu-
sions. Suppose an agent has to predict the value of a ran-
dom variable Y after observing another random variable
X . Seidenfeld observes, as we did in Section 2, that the
minimax paradigm can be applied to this situation in two
different ways:
1. In the local minimax strategy, the agent uses the min-
imax action relative to the set of distributions for Y
conditioned on the observed value of X .
2. In the global minimax strategy, the agent adopts the
minimax decision rule (function from observations of
X to actions) relative to the set P of joint distribu-
tions.
Seidenfeld notes, as we did in Section 2, that the local min-
imax strategy is not equivalent to the global minimax strat-
egy. (In his terminology, the extensive form of the decision
problem is not equivalent to the normal form.) Moreover,
he exhibits a rather counterintuitive property of local min-
imax. Suppose that, before observing X , the agent is of-
fered the following proposition. For an additional small
cost (loss), she will not be told the value of X before she
has to predict Y . An agent who uses the local minimax
strategy would accept that proposition, because not observ-
ing X leads to a smaller minimax prediction loss than ob-
serving X . Therefore, a local minimax agent would be
willing to pay not to get information. This is the same phe-
nomenon that we observed in Example 2.2.
Seidenfeld interprets his observations as evidence that the
local minimax strategy is flawed, at least to some extent.
He further views the discrepancy between local and global
minimax as a problematic aspect of the minimax paradigm.
In a closely related context, Augustin [2003] also observes
the discrepancy between the global and the local minimax
strategy, but, as he writes, “there are sound arguments for
both”.
In this paper, we express a third point of view: we regard
both the strategy of ignoring information and the global
minimax loss strategy as reasonable decision rules, prefer-
able to, for example, the local minimax loss strategy. How-
ever, we certainly do not claim that “global minimax loss”
is the only reasonable strategy. For example, as we ex-
plained at the end of Section 3, in some situations mini-
max regret may be more appropriate. Also, as explained in
Section 4, if P has a more complex structure than the one
considered in Sections 2 and 3, then ignoring the informa-
tion may no longer coincide with a global minimax strat-
egy. It remains to be investigated whether, in such cases,
there is a clear preference for either ignoring information
or for global minimax.
“Cost-free information should never be ignored” As
we observed in Section 3, a purely subjective Bayesian
who is not “pragmatic” in our sense should always con-
dition on all the available information: information should
never be ignored. This result can be reconciled with our
findings by noting that it depends on the agent representing
her uncertainty with a single distribution. In the Bayesian
case, the agent starts with a set of distributions P , but this
set is then transformed to a single distribution by adopting
a subjective prior on P . The expected value of informa-
tion is then calculated using an expectation based on the
agent’s prior on P . In contrast, in the “Bayesian” analysis
of Section 3, for reasons explained at the beginning of Sec-
tion 3, we computed the expectation relative to all prob-
abilities in a set P that is meant to represent the agent’s
uncertainty. Consequently, our results differ from the sub-
jective Bayesian analysis.
6 Discussion
We have shown that, in the minimax sense, sometimes it is
better to ignore information, at least for a while, rather than
updating. This strategy is essentially different from other
popular probability updating mechanisms such as the non-
Bayesian mechanism (local minimax) described in Sec-
tion 3 and the Bayesian mechanism of Section 2. The only
method we are aware of that leads to similar results is the
following form of the maximum-entropy formalism: the
agent first chooses the unique distribution P ∗ ∈ P that
maximizes the Shannon entropy, and then predicts Y based
on the conditional distribution P ∗(Y = · | X = x) [Cover
and Thomas 1991]. Such an application of the Maximum
Entropy Principle will ignore the value of X if P contains
all distributions with the given marginal PrY . However, as
we indicated in Section 4, updating by ignoring can still
be useful if P contains only a subset of the distributions
with given PrY . Yet in such cases, it is well known that
the maximum entropy P ∗ may introduce counterintuitive
dependencies between X and Y after all, as exemplified by
the Judy Benjamin problems [Grove and Halpern 1997],
thereby making the method different from merely ignor-
ing X after all. Our minimax-optimality results depend on
the assumption that the set of possible prior distributions
contains no information about the possible correlations be-
tween the variable of interest and the observed variable. In
addition, they depend on the assumption that the payoff de-
pends only on the actual value and the predicted value of
the variable of interest.
One way of understanding the issues involved here is in
terms of knowledge, as advocated by Halpern and Tuttle
[1993], specifically, the knowledge of the agent and the
knowledge of the “adversary” who is choosing the loss
function. The knowledge of the agent is encoded by the set
of possible prior distributions. The knowledge of the adver-
sary is encoded in our assumptions on the loss function. If
the adversary does not know the observation at the time that
the loss function is determined, then the loss function can-
not depend on the observation; if the adversary knows the
observation, then it can. More generally, especially if neg-
ative losses (i.e., gains) are allowed, and the adversary can
know the true distribution, then the adversary can choose
whether to allow the agent to play at all, depending on the
observation. In future work, we plan to consider the impact
of allowing the adversary this extra degree of freedom.
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